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Unrecorded Volunteer Contributions in
Congressional Elections
by
Kathleen Tait

Introduction
In his book Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew claims that most of
what occurs in the United States Congress
can be explained by the congressman's drive
for re-election (Mayhew 1974, 13). If we
accept Mayhew's thesis, it stands to reason
that campaigns are a very significant part of
the national political process and that the
factors that cause candidates to win or lose
elections are central to the study of congressional election campaigns. One of the most
obvious factors in determining the success of
a candidate to win elections is his or her
ability to raise funds. In examining races
for constitutional offices and the U.S. Senate, it was found that "heavy campaign
spending by either party . . . is highly
correlated to victory: the heavy spenders
winning 72 percent of the time. In cases
where one party spends 80 percent or more
of the money, the party engaged in heavy

spending wins all of the time" (Magleby
1986, 28).
Because of reforms in campaign finance
law in the last decade, contributions made to
candidates and expenditures made by candidates are recorded and disclosed. Although
there seems to be a correlation between a
candidate's expenditures and the election
outcome, much campaign activity goes
unrecorded. An important example of this
"unrecorded element" of campaigns, often
included in the larger subject of "soft money," is volunteerism. Candidates are not
required to report the volunteer time contributed to their campaigns, whether it be
contributed by individuals or groups of
individuals, such as labor unions and tax
exempt (SOl (c)) organizations. There seems
to be at least one invisible variable in the
equation for a campaign's success: contributions of unrecorded volunteer services.
Because volunteer work goes unrecorded, it
is difficult to tell exactly what impact it has
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on individual campaigns or federal elections
on the whole.
By one estimate, the "effective use of
volunteers can reduce a campaign's payroll
by 20 percent" (Webb and Mockus 1981,
19). Twenty percent of a small local election may not be significant, but millions of
dollars are spent on federal elections. In
1984, Jesse Helms (R-NC) spent $16.5
million in his campaign for re-election to the
U.S. Senate. His opponent, James Hunt,
spent $9.5 million just to lose (Ladd 1986,
1). Considering the astronomical expenditures of some Congressional elections, this
means that volunteer work could have quite
a sizeable impact on campaigns. Further, it
is likely that volunteers have a much greater
impact on campaigns than simply a reduction in campaign costs, which will be discussed later.
Unfortunately, because it is not recorded, volunteer work is impossible to quantify.
This may be the reason that not much attention is given to volunteerism in campaign
finance literature. My review of the literature is certainly not exhaustive, but I did not
find the topic I will discuss in this paper
addressed at any length in the literature I
surveyed. In the remainder of this paper, I
will first discuss campaign volunteerism in
general. I will then look at labor unions and
how campaigns may benefit from them in
ways that are unrecorded. Lastly, I will do
a brief examination of how tax exempt
organizations make unrecorded volunteer
contributions to campaigns.

Volunteers
Volunteers are worth more to a campaign
than the free labor they provide. "The
presence of volunteers gives a campaign
visibility and the appearance of momentum.

Volunteers suggest to voters that the candidate is worthy of commitment" (Webb and
Mockus 1981, 20). Webb and Mockus
further claim that not only do volunteers
"help deliver messages to voters--by licking
envelopes, writing notes or telephoning
friends--they are messages in themselves"
(1981, 20). Many voters know very little
about the group of candidates from which
they must choose. But those voters who
have a family member, friend, or neighbor
that has volunteered for one of the candidates may be more likely to vote for that
candidate. Volunteers perform more services for a campaign than their delineated
responsibilities suggest. In this way, volunteers are worth more to a candidate than the
money he would lose paying hired help to
perform the same labor.
Yet, despite the other advantages, the
biggest and most obvious advantage of using
volunteers is that they provide a lot of work
for no cost; and there is no requirement to
report volunteer contribution of time to the
Federal Elections Commission. The Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) states:
The value of services provided without compensation by any individual who volunteers on behalf of
a candidate or political committee is not a political
contribution (11 CFR lOO.7(b)(3)).

Not only is volunteer work free, but
through one clause in the campaign finance
law, volunteer work can actually make it
possible for a Political Action Committee
(PAC) or political party to contribute more
to a campaign than it would otherwise be
allowed. This clause in the Code of Federal
Regulations is referred to as the "volunteer
intensive activity loophole." It reads as
follows:
The payment by a candidate for any public office
(including State or local office), or by such can-
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didate's authorized committee, of the costs of that
candidate's campaign materials which include
information on or any reference to a candidate for
Federal office and which are used in connection
with volunteer activities (such as pins, bumper
stickers, handbills, brochures, posters, and yard
signs) is not a contribution to such candidate for
Federal office, provided that the payment is not for
the use of broadcasting, newspapers, magazines,
billboards, direct mail or similar types of general
public communication or political advertising. The
payment of the portion of the cost of such materials
allocable to Federal candidates shall be made from
contributions subject to the limitations and prohibitions of the Act. For the purposes of II CFR
lOO.7(b)(16), the term "direct mail" means any
mailing(s) by commercial vendors or mailing(s)
made from lists which were not developed by the
candidate (11 CFR lOO.7(b)(16) emphasis mine).

The definition of the term "direct mail"
is crucial to the way in which organizations
are able to take advantage of this clause.
The portion of the CFR quoted above states
that the cost of materials for the purpose of
direct mail is considered a campaign contribution--regardless of whether a volunteer
works on this material. If, however, commercial vendors do not perform the mailing
of the material, and the mailing list used is
developed by the candidate or his campaign,
then the material is not considered to be
direct mail.
Limitations set on mailing lists should
not to be taken lightly. In fact, "the single
most important factor in the success of
direct mail fund raising is the list you use"
(Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 171). This
does not mean, however, that candidates
who must generate their own mailing lists
are at a serious disadvantage. Beaudry and
Schaeffer explain to campaigners that
"there's no better list than [their] own of
proven contributors" (1986, 171). So the
restriction on the origin of the mailing list is
probably not as big of a hindrance as it

might seem to candidates who choose to
take advantage of this loophole.
As Brooks Jackson of the Wall Street
Journal claims, political parties, political
actions committees, or other groups who
promote candidates for federal office, can-and do--take advantage of this clause
through political and fund raising mailings.
Jackson explains that an organization, such
as the Republican National Committee, can
fund the printing and postage of elaborate
and expensive mailings and prepare peel
away preprinted labels for the mailings
(Jackson 1988). As long as volunteer hands
place the address labels on these mailings,
no part of the cost of the mailings is con sidered--for the purpose of contribution limitations--to be a contribution to the campaign
of the promoted candidate. This kind of
activity is considered to be "volunteer intensive" and thus does not need to be reported
as a contribution. Here we see that a proper
understanding of the Code of Federal Regulations is crucial to the effective utilization
of campaign funds.
Ed Goaz, former legal counsel at the
Republican National Committee, claims in
reference to the "volunteer intensive activity
loophole," that no party has an exclusive
advantage over the other in using and interpreting campaign finance law. He does
admit, however, that this particular loophole
was both discovered by and is used most by
Republicans (Goaz 1988). So, although
Democrats tend to benefit more from
volunteerism in general, Republicans seem
especially adept at taking advantage of this
particular loophole in the federal code.
Of course with all of the advantages of
using volunteers also come some disadvantages. Unlike paid employees, volunteers
have no obligation to perform quality work-and nothing to lose if they don't. They are
often unreliable and are even considered a
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"pain in the neck" (Webb and Mockus 1981,
19). Various campaigns may see the disadvantages to using volunteers to be greater
than the advantages and, therefore, choose
to use hired help rather than volunteers.
Although it is impossible to tell with the
available data, it appears that Democrats use
volunteers more than Republicans. It is
logical that various socio-economic factors
have an effect on how an individual will
contribute to her party, or the candidate of
her choice. For those who have sufficient
money, it may be easier to contribute dollars
than time, while those who earn very little
money may find that all they can contribute
is their time. This means that, because the
Democratic party is known as the party of
the poor and tends to attract the blue-collar
work force, it is likely that Republicans
donate dollars and Democrats donate time.
In their article on effective utilization of
campaign volunteers, Webb and Mockus cite
a nationwide poll sponsored by Targeting
Systems, Inc. of Washington, D.C. which
suggests that behind professors and students,
"blue-collar workers seem to be the third
most likely source of campaign workers"
(Webb and Mockus 1981, 20).
Although the national composition of the
volunteer force may seem primarily Democratic, regionally, this is not always the
case. Kay Christiansen, former campaign
manager to Rep. Wayne Owens (D-UT),
believes that in Utah there are several factors that work against the national trend. In
a state where the overwhelming majority of
the populace is Republican, where labor
unions are not particularly strong, and
where civic involvement is encouraged of
the many noncareer mothers in the state, it
is easy to imagine a Republican volunteer
force much stronger than a Democratic one
(Christiansen 1988). This heightened Republican volunteering may be one of the

factors that cause the GOP to continually
have so much success in Utah. Bob Bumek
of the Deseret News agrees with this theory
and points out that indeed Utah is atypical
on almost any issue dealing with partisanship (Bumek 1988).
Although not every campaign chooses to
use volunteers, they can be an important
part of a campaign that does choose to use
them. Volunteers can help the image of a
campaign, affect the voting decisions of
their families and friends, and provide a
significant force of labor at no cost. Labor
unions are one of the best and most organized ways for a campaign to get volunteers,
as well as being another interesting area in
which unrecorded contributions of service to
campaigns occur.

Labor Unions
Labor unions can be an important resource
of support for election campaigns in several
ways. Unions may distribute material and
communicate (via phone banks or otherwise)
to their "members, executive or administrative personnel, other employees, and their
families," supporting one candidate over
another in a federal election (11 CFR
114.4(c». When unions wish to communicate with the general public, however, that
communication must be purely educational
or participational, meaning that it must be
non-partisan. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) states that labor unions may
1.

2.

make non-partisan registration and get-out-the-vote communications to the general public
(11 CFR 114.4(b)(2)),
distribute to the general public, or reprint in
whole and distribute to the general public,
any registration or voting information, such
as instructional materials, which has been
produced by the official election administrators (11 CFR 114.4(b)(3»,
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3.

4.

prepare and distribute to the general public
the voting records of Members of Congress
as long as the preparation and distribution is
not for the purpose of influencing a Federal
election (11 CFR 114.4(b)(4)), and
prepare and distribute to the general public
non-partisan voter guides consisting of questions posed to candidates concerning their
positions on campaign issues and the candidates' responses to those questions (11 CFR
114.4(b)(5)).

The CFR also enumerates many criteria by
which these activities may be judged to be
partisan. It would appear that any attempt
at partisan campaigning to the general public
by labor unions would be prohibited by the
CFR. All of these criteria, however, pertain
to the nature of the printed or spoken message given; there are no regulations that
dictate who these educational or participational campaigns must be directed toward.
If a get-out-the-vote drive is targeted at a
certain segment of the population already
known to be likely to vote Democrat, then,
although the drive is not illegally partisan,
the results may very well be partisan.
In addition to the support that labor
unions give as organizations, Brooks Jackson of the Wall Street Journal claims that
they also supply the Democrats a pool of
workers not available to Republicans (Jackson 1988). Unions are convenient for Democrats not only because of their partisanship
and the number of volunteers they can
provide, but because they are particularly
well equipped to do campaign work. Jackson explains that "a lot of what unions do is
run elections" within their own organizations, and are therefore well prepared to
make the transition to work on national
Once labor union
election campai:sns.
members make the decision to use their own
time to volunteer to work on a campaign,
they are individual volunteers. At this

point, they are no longer constrained by the
CFR that limits the activity of their union.
Besides the obvious advantage of manpower, labor unions also often have phone
banks in operation. This is a great advantage to candidates who have good relations
with unions--usually Democrat candidates.
A union uses its phone bank in the daytime
for inter-organizational work and then leases
the phone bank to a campaign after normal
business hours for campaign work (Jackson
1988). This kind of arrangement proves to
be particularly convenient for those campaigns who are supported by labor unions.
Beaudry and Schaeffer instruct campaign
managers that the smart approach is to go to
a "friendly business, labor union, or civic
organization that has multiple phone lines"
(Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 100). The
Code of Federal Regulations states that
persons . . . who make any use of corporate or
labor organization facilities, such as by using
telephones or typewriters or borrowing office
furniture, for activity in connection with a Federal
election are required to reimburse the corporation
or labor organization within a commercially
reasonable time in the amount of the nomlai and
usual rental charge. as defined in II CFR
l00.7(a){l)(iii)(B), for the use of the facilities (11
CFR 114.9(d), emphasis mine).

"Normal and usual rental charge" is defined
in the Code of Federal Regulations as "the
price of those goods in the market from
which they ordinarily would have been
purchased at the time of the contribution."
(11 CFR 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (B)).
It is difficult, however, to apply this
definition to the rental of a phone bank; a
phone bank is such an uncommon item of
rental that it is almost impossible to determine its going market rate. Because of the
affinity labor unions generally have for
Democrats, it seems reasonable that labor
unions would lease their phone banks to
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Democrats at a very low rate. As a result,
Democrats can, for a small fee, lease labor
union phone banks that are already in place.
Workers who are used to manning the
phones for the union can volunteer to work
on the campaign after hours. On the other
hand, for Republicans to set up a phone
bank, they must pay for the installation and
rental of phones, as well as find--and often
pay for--workers to man them.
"Installation can become a very expensive proposition since local phone companies
extract large deposits from political campaigns" (Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 100).
And indeed this is true. Central Communications Consultants of Salt Lake City informs that the rental charge for 30 standard
single-line phones is $500 per month. On
top of that, the phone company's (Mountain
Bell in this case) charge for the use of 30
phone lines would be $1,500 per month. If
a phone system is installed (a separate
charge), the use of the lines would cost $500
per month. This means that over a sixmonth period, a campaign could pay between $6,000 and $12,000 for each phone
bank they have in operation across the
country. This is a sizeable financial burden
for a campaign to bear.
The National Right to Work Committee
prepared a complaint filed in March of 1984
by Ralph Hettinga claiming that "eight labor
unions had made prohibited in-kind contributions by providing telephone services and
equipment and office space to Walter Mondale's presidential prenomination campaign
at less than fair market value" (Alexander
1987, 48). But how can the "fair market
value" of such services be accurately assessed? We can determine how much it
would cost for a campaign to run a phone
on its own (above paragraph), but that does
not determine the fair market value of the
part-time rental of a phone bank; if a cam-

paign uses the phone bank of another organization after hours, then using the cost to
run a phone bank independently certainly
would be an excessive rental fee.
It is important to note that there is somewhat of a Republican equivalent to the
Democrat-favored labor union; it is the
corporation. Throughout the Code of Federal Regulations, corporations and labor unions are discussed together, as if they were
the same type of organization. Often there
will be a section of code addressing labor
union behavior followed by a nearly identical section of code addressing the activity of
corporations. So it is important to remember that any tactic used by labor unions to
benefit Democrats may also be used by
corporations to benefit Republicans.
There are some factors concerning nonreported benefits of service that seem to
give a campaign which is more closely tied
to labor unions an advantage over a campaign that is supported by a corporation.
Some of these factors have already been
mentioned. First, the nature of labor unions
is such that they already have phone banks
set up. They are political organizations,
accustomed to using phone banks for internal politics. Corporations, on the other
hand, do not have the same type of political
structure and do not have the same kind of
need for a phone bank as do labor unions.
Second, those who belong to labor unions are more likely to be volunteers. The
Target Systems, Inc. poll, referred to earlier
in this paper, states that after professors and
students, blue collar workers are the third
most likely group to volunteer time to political campaigns. Apparently, white collar
workers--those who would most likely be
corporation employees--were not likel y
enough to volunteer to be mentioned. While
it is true that some blue-collar workers are
members of unions and employees of corpo-

CAMPAIGN VOLUNTEERS 7
rations at the same time, there are some
important differences. The composition of
the leadership of the two organizations is
very different.
The leadership of labor unions is composed of blue-collar workers, which is very
different from the executive, uppermiddle
class composition of corporation leadership.
Also, the organization from which an individual gains his or her identity should be
considered. Blue-collar workers are consistently more loyal to their unions than their
corporate employers.
Third, labor unions are renowned for
being a serious political force in that their
members will vote as a block for the candidate they endorse--usually a Democratic
candidate. Although corporation executives
are likely to have the same interests among
themselves and therefore vote for the same
candidates, corporations do not have the
same history of voting loyally in blocks.
Clearly, labor unions are an important
sources of unreported volunteer service
contributions in the acts they perform as a
union and as a vehicle by which to attract
prospective campaign volunteers. These
same types of valuable contributions to
campaigns are provided by other organizations which are, unlike labor unions, not
constrained by the Federal Election Commission.

SOle

Or~anizations

Beyond labor unions, Democrats enjoy
another major source of unrecorded volunteer contributions. The "Non-Profit! Democrat Political Network," as labeled in a
recent National Republican Senatorial Committee report prepared by Bob Bissen, the
Director of Special Projects at the National
Republican Senatorial Committee, has

emerged as another source of "volunteerlike" effort .. The tax-exempt organizations
(known as 501(c) organizations) in this
network perform many of the same functions
normally performed by volunteers; these are
activities that here too are not reportable to
the Federal Elections Commission.
The two 50I(c) organizations in the
"network" that concern themselves with
political campaigns are 501(c)(3) (charitable
or educational) organizations, and 50I(c)(4)
(social welfare) organizations (Tax-&empt
Organizations 1987, 6). The report explains
that understanding the limitations on political
activity that these organizations have helps
to explain what the organizations do.
A 501(c)(3) organization "may not participate directly on behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate for public office."
Like labor unions, it can perform educational and participational communication activities directed toward the general public. A
50I(c)(4) organization "must operate primarily in a manner designed to further the
common good by bringing about social
improvement and civic betterment." The
group may be clearly partisan and may
openly support or oppose a candidate "as
long as the primary purpose of the group
remains promotion of social welfare" (Tax&empt Organizations 1987, 6). "Social
welfare" is obviously a broad category; this
kind of ambiguity certainly accounts for the
freedom with which these groups act, a
subject which will be discussed later.
The above mentioned report, known as
the Kasten Report, claims that there are
many 501 (c) organizations that involve
themselves in political campaigns, but that
"there is a nationwide network of groups [in
25 states] working together" headed by the
group known as Citizen Action. The report
states that "shared office space, affiliates
listed on letterhead and similar boards of
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directors and officers help tie the various
groups together" (Tax-Exempt Organizations
1987, 1).
The groups in this network were found
to perform many of the same volunteer
efforts previously discussed in the labor
union section of this paper. A Citizen
Action brochure explains some of the services it provides for candidates the group
chooses to support.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The Electoral Canvass. A membership contact, voter education and get-out-the-vote
program.
Volunteer recruitment.
Issues development and briefing papers.
Phone banks.
Media. Free media on the candidate's stands
on the issues and paid media in targeted
races.
Professional staff assistance. Citizen Action
staff are trained and experienced in campaign
management and a variety of campaign skills
(Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987,2).

The Kasten Report was prepared in
reaction to the experience of Senator Bob
Kasten (R-WI) with the Wisconsin Action
Coalition (WAC) in his 1986 Senatorial race
against Ed Garvy . WAC campaigned to
defeat Kasten in his efforts to become reelected, but did not succeed. The report
claims that other Republican senators and
Senate candidates across the nation were
similarly attacked by groups like WAC. "In
races nationwide groups such as WAC tried,
and in many cases succeeded, in having a
major impact on behalf of the Democrat in
the race" (Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987,
1).

In the Wisconsin Kasten/Garvey senatorial race, WAC and other 50I(c) organizations affiliated with the national Action
Coalition, spearheaded a "truth drive,"
passing out flyers and holding press conferences. WAC claims that on election day it

made 18,500 get-out-the-vote phone calls
and believes itself to be responsible for 2-4
percent of the total votes cast for Ed Garvey
(Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987, 5).
The report claims that WAC "is one of
a growing number of groups that have taken
advantage of their Internal Revenue Service
50I(c) (3) or 501(c)(4) tax exempt status and
become increasingly active in political campaigns, providing either direct or indirect
assistance to candidates" (Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987, 1). As mentioned, a national 501(c) organization, known as Citizen
Action is the parent group of many of these
organizations (Tax-Exempt Organizations
1987, 2).
Steve Taggart of the Public Affairs
Advisory Group in Salt Lake City claims
that much of what Kasten experienced in
Wisconsin also occurred in various 1986
state and national races in Idaho. Taggart
reports that Idaho Fair Share, a 501(c)
organization, performed get-out-the-voter
drives, sent lawn sign crews, and created
publicity in much the same way WAC did in
Wisconsin. Idaho Fair Share even performed "die-ins" (where participants lay seemingly lifeless on the ground) to attract media
attention (Taggart 1988).
These 501(c) organizations must answer
to the Internal Revenue Service, but federal
and state regulation of them is minimal and
much of their activity goes unreported.
Organizations such as those discussed above
do not necessarily have to be in support of
Democratic candidates. All of those in this
1986 "network," however, supported Democrats and such organizations seemed to have
a significant impact on the outcome of at
least one congressional election.
Ben Ginsberg, of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, stated in a telephone interview that there are no "behind
the scenes" groups like those discussed
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above for Republican candidates (Ginsberg
1988). This suggests that although both
parties can benefit from the unrecorded
volunteer services of 501(c) organizations,
both parties don't.
It would be valid to investigate the
legality of the behavior of these tax -exempt
organizations, and further, it might be a
valuable exercise to scrutinize the law concerning these types of organizations. For
the purpose of this paper, however, the
significance of the activities of these organizations and others lies in their unrecorded
effect on the outcome of federal elections.
Because contributions of volunteer effort are
not considered contributions according to the
Code of Federal Regulations, a supportive
organization (PAC, political party, 501(c)
group, etc.) can donate large sums of money
in addition to the volunteer effort they coordinate and provide without going over their
contribution limit. A candidate can have the
advantage of claiming to be the "poor" man
in the race when in actuality, he may be
receiving the same benefits as his opponent
who must pay for these services. Also, if
they are unrecorded, then they are very
likely also going to be uncalculated. In
other words, when engineering elections or
studying the causes of victory or defeat in
elections, we may be ignoring some very
significant factors.

Conclusions
Beyond a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds is his or her ability to use those
funds effectively. If any of the factors in
the formula for a successful election campaign is overlooked, then the campaign may
be mishandled. When Federal Election
Statistics are released, it is easy to find the
number of dollars spent in the campaign of

a congressional election candidate, but
because candidates are not required to record and report volunteer activity, it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to uncover this
information. It is then only a hope to be
able to determine the significance of these
activities in federal elections.
Judging from the reaction of some to
unrecorded volunteer contributions, we can
conclude that they have at least some significance. Critics of the Federal Election Commission claim that certain "expenditures may
be legal but they escape federal campaign
disclosure requirements," and that they have
created a "underground political economy"
(Alexander 1987, 54). These critics list
several such expenditures, including:
Use of corporate and union or membership organization treasury funds to pay the costs of nonreportable communications with employees, stockholders
or members advocating the election or defeat of
specific candidates.
Use by tax-exempt foundations of unlimited and
undisclosed tax-deductible money--some of it
channeled to the foundations by national party
committees and their allies--to pay for ostensibly
nonpartisan but carefully targeted voter registration
and turnout drives (Alexander 1987, 53).

The ethics of much of what goes on in
this underground political economy are
questionable. Is it ethical to keep the letter
of a law but act in a way that is contrary to
the intent of that law? The logic of the law
is also somewhat problematic. If the loopholes that are currently discovered and used
exist, then how many more undiscovered
loopholes may there be? There are certainly
more than I have discussed in this paper.
These are all very valid topics of discussion but, after having studied the subject of
unrecorded volunteer contributions made to
election campaigns, it would be difficult for
me to editorialize on the ethical aspects of
this underground political economy or make
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recommendations for a change in federal
policy or federal election law. There is
simply not enough data to make a thorough
study of this situation, or problem, as many
see it. The only definite conclusion I can
make is that unrecorded volunteer campaign
contributions and the effect they have on
federal elections is an area that needs further
research.
Tenuously, I can also make some other
conclusions. It seems that labor unions and
tax-exempt organizations give Democrats a
serious advantage over Republicans in the
area of volunteer contributions, and this
advantage is not reported. Some may consider this to be a just advantage that merely
raises Democrats up to equal ground in
campaign resources with Republicans, who
consistently benefit from dollar contributions. Others may consider it to be an
unfair advantage--one that should be ended
by forcing organizations to report contributions of volunteer effort, counting them
against their contributions limitations.
I would suggest an approach that takes
both of these sides of the argument into
consideration. Contribution of volunteer
effort ought to be quantified and reported,
but not counted against an individual's or

organization's contribution limit.
This
would accomplish several important ends.
First, those who are now able to falsely
claim to be financial underdogs could no
longer do so in the same manner that they
have been. Second, forcing volunteer contributions to be counted as part of an organization's contribution limits would
discourage volunteerism, and in turn discourage much of the populace from important active participation in the political
process. Under my proposal, campaigns
would still be rewarded for using volunteer
labor. It stands to reason that the greater
the awareness of, and value placed on,
volunteer activity--of the many types heretofore discussed--the more likely members of
this democracy will be to participate. This,
in tum, increases the integrity of our idea of
true representation. Lastly, with the mandatory reporting of volunteer activity, the art
of engineering campaigns moves closer to
being a science. This will not only provide
academics with fascinating and useful information, but it may result in increased use of
volunteers in campaigns. And this, in turn,
could very well result in less money being
spent on now astronomically expensive
congressional elections.
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